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6 7	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
8	COUNTY OF MENDOCINO * * * * * *		
9 10	WILLIAM H. MOORES, TONA ELIZABETH MOORES,) Case No. SCUK CVG 09-54665	
11	Plaintiffs,))) PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE:	
12 13	V.) PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE) CONDEMNATION LIABILITY	
14	IRISH BEACH WATER DISTRICT, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,) Judge: Hon. Ann Moorman	
15	Defendants.)	
16 17 18 19	GORDON MOORES, SANDY MOORES, MENDOCINO COAST PROPERTIES, a California Corporation, and MOORES ASSOCIATES, a partnership,		
20	Real Parties in Interest.)	
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	PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE (i DNE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY	

I. INTRODUCTION

A governmental agency may not take a person's property absent just compensation. Thus, while the government maintains the power to condemn a person's property, it must pay that person before doing so. Where the government takes a person's property and fails to pay just compensation, it is liable for inverse condemnation.

The central issue in this Phase of Trials involves determination of Plaintiffs William Moores and Tona Moores (collectively "Moores") claim for liability against Defendant Irish Beach Water District ("IBWD") for inverse condemnation, or a taking, without just compensation, of: a certain well located on Moores property known as the "T5 Well"; water taken, and that which may be taken, from the T5 Well; and, IBWD's use of access roadways and other improvements to operate and service the T5 Well.

Moores owns several parcels of real property within the service boundaries of IBWD, 13 which is a California Water District, i.e. a governmental agency. More than two decades in the 14 past, Moores granted IBWD by deed the right to use and take water from another well located 15 16 on Moores' property along with that well's pumping facilities and rights of access and use of a 17 roadway, pipelines, and utilities necessary to operate that well. The deeded rights are specific 18 and limited in scope to that particular well. Notwithstanding that, in 2008, IBWD drilled, 19 constructed, and began operating the new T5 Well. Furthermore, IBWD took water from the T5 20 Well and used access roadways, pipelines, and utilities constructed by Moores to operate it. 21

At no time did Moores grant IBWD any right or permission to the property, well, water, roadways, pipelines, or utilities associated with the T5 Well. Additionally, IBWD has not paid Moores any compensation, let alone just compensation, for the same. Consequently, IBWD inversely condemned the subject property, well, water, roadways, pipelines, and utilities.

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1	II. BACKGROUND FACTS ¹
2	Moores owns several parcels of real property in Irish Beach, CA. Included is an
3	approximate 18-acre parcel referred to in this action as "Moores Property." Moores Property is
4	located in the West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 32, Township 14 North, Range 16
5	West, Mount Diablo Basin Meridian. (Stipulation, p.2 ¶ 2.)
6	IBWD is a California Water District, organized and existing under the laws of the State
7	of California. (Stipulation, p. 2 ¶1.) IBWD is a public agency that provides water to properties
8	within its service boundaries for public purposes. (Id. p. 4 \P 12 & p.5 \P 17.) The Moores
9	Property is located within the service boundaries of IBWD and it, along with other similarly-
10	situated real property owned by Moores and unnamed third parties, maintains the right to
11 12	receive water from IBWD. (Id., p.1 ¶ 4.)
12	A. IBWD's Granted Rights.
14	In or about 1988-1990, and pursuant to recorded deeds admitted in this matter and
15	referred to as "Stipulated Deeds and Documents" in the parties' Stipulation, Moores conveyed
16	the following to IBWD:
17	• "A water well commonly known as the "Unit 9 Well" or "Number (No.) 9
18	Well," which is located within the 30-foot diameter area described in the easement made part of Document 11632 (at Book 1697 page 413), which
19	document is, its entirety, Exhibit 4 of the Stipulated Deeds and Documents described below." (<i>Id.</i> , p.1 ¶ 5.a., emphasis not original.)
20	• A 60' by 60' water storage tank site easement. (Id. ¶ 5.b.)
21	• A water storage tank (i.e. a physical tank) located on the referenced 60' by 60'
22 23	tank site easement. (Id. ¶ 5.c.)
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25	¹ This section's discussion of background facts is for the court's convenience and ease of reference in this brief. Further details are presented in cited Stipulation for Phase 1 Trial – Liability for Inverse Condemnation, submitted
26	to the court on December 21, 2011. That document is hereafter referenced and cited as "Stipulation" and exhibits attached thereto are simply referenced as "Exhibit"
	- 2 - PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

1	• Facilities on Moores Property used in operating the Unit 9 Well. (Id. \P 5.d.)
2	• The right to "access the Unit 9 Well, the water storage tank located on the [] 60' by 60' tank site easement, and associated Unit 9 Well facilities on the Moores Property via a roadway commonly known as the Alta Mesa Road." (<i>Id.</i> ,
3 4	p.3 ¶ 7, emphasis not original.) The right of access across the non-public, or "Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road," is described further in the parties'
5	Stipulation. Moores owns nearly all of the parcels across which the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road runs. (<i>Ibid.</i>) Said road is further described in the parties' Stipulation (pp. 3-4, \P 9) and in Exhibits 1 through 3.
6 7	• In order to allow IBWD to operate the Unit 9 Well, Moores granted IBWD an easement to use: "(a) electricity and other utilities, including water distribution
8	lines and telephone lines, to operate and run service to and from the Unit 9 Well on the Moores Property; and, (b) water distribution lines to operate and
9 10	run service to and from the water storage tank located on the aforementioned 60' by 60' tank site easement and Unit 9 Well on the Moores Property." (<i>Id.</i> ¶ 8, emphasis not original. ²)
11	The Improvements run adjacent to the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road. (Id. p. 4 \P
12	10.) In our about 1988, Moores constructed and installed both the Private Portion of Alta Mesa
13	Road and the Improvements at <i>Moores' expense.</i> (Id. ¶ 11.)
14 15	The Unit 9 Well was drilled in approximately 1975, and it was the only water well on
16	Moores Property until IBWD drilled and constructed the "T5 Well." (Id., p.3 ¶ 7:11-13.) The
17	Unit 9 Well provides water to properties within the service boundaries of IBWD, including
18	properties Moores owns. (Id. \P 6.) "IBWD has pumped water from the Unit 9 Well since at
19	least 1989 for use [] within the service boundaries of IBWD as part of its operations as a public
20	agency in providing water to such properties for public purposes." (Id., p.4 \P 12.)
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2 <i>3</i> 26	² For purposes of this action, the parties stipulated that the referenced electricity and other utilities, water distribution lines, and telephone lines may be collectively referred to as the "Improvements." (<i>Id.</i> ¶ 8.)
	- 3 - PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

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IBWD's Construction of the T5 Well.

In August 2008, IBWD drilled and constructed a well known T5 Well.³ (Id., pp.4-5 ¶ 2 13.) The T5 Well is located on Moores Property within the 60' x 60' water storage tank site 3 easement referred to above. (Ibid.) "The T5 Well is approximately 150-200 yards from the Unit 9 Well, and the T5 Well is **not located** within the 30-foot diameter space referenced in the easement made part of Document 11632 (at Book 1697 page 413), which document is, its entirety, Exhibit 4 of the Stipulated Deeds and Documents" previously admitted. (Id., p.5 ¶ 14, emphasis not original.)

IBWD: uses the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road to access the T5 Well on Moores' 10 Property; and, IBWD uses, or has the opportunity to use, the other Improvements to operate and 11 (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Since the date the T5 Well was run service to and from the T5 Well. 12 constructed, IBWD has taken water from that well for IBWD's use in providing water to 13 properties within its service boundaries as part of its operations as a public agency in providing 14 water for public purposes. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) "The T5 Well, water pumped from it, IBWD's use of 15 16 the T5 Well, IBWD's access to the T5 Well, including upon the Private Portion of Alta Mesa 17 Road, and IBWD's use of other Improvements are for public purposes." (Id. ¶ 19, emphasis 18 not original.)

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С. **Summary of Facts & Contentions**

Of course, Moores contends IBWD had no permission or authority to construct, and 21 inversely condemned, the T5 Well, water in it, use of the access roadway for the T5 Well, and 22 use of other Improvements for operation of the T5 Well. (Stipulation, "Contentions and Issues," 23 p. 6 ¶¶ 1-2.) Moores also contends that nothing, including the Stipulated Deeds and 24

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- 26 ³ Also known as the "Tank 5 Well" and identified in Moores' pleadings as the "new well." (Id. ¶ 13.) PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

Documents, provides IBWD any right to the same and nothing evidences payment of just compensation. (Id. \P 2.) IBWD contends it had permission and the right to construct the T5 Well based on the Stipulated Deeds and Documents. (Stipulation, "Contentions and Issues," p. 6 ¶ 3:18-19.) IBWD further contends that two particular documents submitted as part of said stipulated deeds and documents demonstrate that IBWD justly compensated Moores for T5 Well. (Id., lines 19-21.) It is noteworthy that IBWD stipulates that "no compensation otherwise was paid to Moores in regard to the T5 Well." (Id., lines 21-23.)

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IBWD defense fails for numerous reasons, not the least of which is the fact that all relevant grants from Moores to IBWD specifically concerned only one of two things: (1) the Unit 9 Well; and, (2) a tank for water storage and easement to place a water storage tank. In 11 other words, the grants had nothing whatsoever to do with the T5 Well. These facts are quite 12 evident by review of the parties' stipulation concerning the grants, which are cited above and 13 key portions of which are bolded for ease of reference. Furthermore, and as explained in further 14 detail below, the law simply does not allow IBWD to extend its rights to drill a new well and 15 16 take water from Moores' property wherever and whenever it so desires.

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III. LEGAL DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENT

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Α.

Inverse Condemnation - General Legal Principles

The United States Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived of property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." (U.S. Const., Amend V.) The California Constitution provides, "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation has first been paid to the owner." (Calif. Const. (Art. I) § 19.) The basic issues under these provisions involve: (1) whether private property was "taken" or "damaged"; and (2) whether the taking or

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damage was for a public use. (Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 Cal.3d 266, 279-284, judgment affirmed in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255; abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc (2005) 544 U.S. 528.)

There is no prohibition on the government taking private property for public use. (Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (2003) 538 U.S. 216, 233.) Rather, the United States and California Constitutions require that the government pay just compensation for the taking. (Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 194; superseded by statute.)

While the U.S. Constitution and California Constitution require compensation for a 10 taking of property, the California Constitution also requires compensation for "damage" to 11 property. Generally, however, the distinction between the terms "taken" and "damaged" has 12 been blurred, and they are used interchangeably. (Tilem v. City of Los Angeles (1983) 142 Cal. 13 App. 3d 694, 701, 702, 710.) California courts have recognized the protections of the United 14 States and California to be largely coextensive. (San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City And County of San 15 16 Francisco (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 643, 664.)

17 A public agency has the power to take private property by an action in eminent domain 18 as an inherent attribute of governmental sovereignty. (Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport 19 Authority v. Hensler (2000) 83 Cal. App. 4th 556, 561.) However, a property owner also may 20 have his or her property "taken" or "damaged" by the acts or conduct of a public agency which requires the property owner to initiate an action to recover just compensation. "Inverse 22 condemnation' occurs when there is a public taking of, or interference with, land without formal 23 eminent domain proceedings." (29 Cal. Jur. 3d Eminent Domain § 332 Inverse Condemnation.) 24 In other words, inverse condemnation results from the invasion or appropriation of some 25

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valuable property right by or under the auspices of a public agency or a private entity with the power of eminent domain, which injures the property owner. (*Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura* (1973)10 Cal.3d 110, 119; *Tilem v. City of Los Angeles, supra*, 142 Cal.App.3d 694, 702; emphasis added.) Accordingly, it is the rule that while it is not always necessary that there be an actual physical taking of any part of the property in order to have a taking, "it is necessary that there must be an invasion or an appropriation of some valuable property right which the landowner has to the legal and proper use of his property, which invasion or an appropriation of some valuable property invasion or source of the property of the property in the property invasion or the property invasion or the legal and proper use of his property, which invasion or source of the property of the property in the property invasion or the prop

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B. Inverse Condemnation as Applied to Water Rights

Properties, Inc. v. State (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 349, 355-56.)

appropriation must directly and specially affect the landowner to his injury."

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A property owner has several water-related property rights which are recognized and 12 protected by law. (Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong (1975) 49 13 Cal.App.3d 992, 1000-1002.) Ownership of land appurtenant to groundwater engenders an 14 overlying right to the water. (Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District v. Southern 15 16 California Water Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 891, 905.) An overlying right is the owner's right 17 to take water from the ground underneath the owner's property; it is based on the ownership of 18 the land and is appurtenant thereto. (Wright v. Goleta Water Dist. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 74, 19 83-84; City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1224, 1240; Tehachapi-20 *Cummings, supra*, at p. 1000.) Appropriation of these rights by a public entity entitles the 21 property owner to compensation, either through eminent domain proceedings initiated by the 22 public entity or through an action in inverse condemnation initiated by the property owner. 23 (Peckwith v. Lavezzola (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 211, 218.) 24

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Once acquired, water rights become vested property rights and cannot be infringed by another, or taken by government action, without due process and just compensation. The holders of water rights are entitled to judicial protection against infringement. (*United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd.* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 104.) The right of a riparian owner or overlying user is a property right that can be taken by condemnation, but it cannot be taken for a public use without compensation. (*Id.* at p. 101.) Where land is condemned, everything that enters into its value is to be considered, and compensation must be awarded for any water rights in connection therewith. (*Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudson* (1920) 182 Cal. 48, 52-53.)

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C. The Scope of Easements and Easements as Applied to Water Rights

The fundamental law of easements provides that "an easement conveys rights in or over 11 the land of another." (Thorstrom v. Thorstrom (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1415.) An 12 easement involves primarily the privilege of doing a certain act on, or to the detriment of, 13 another's property. (Ibid.) An easements is classified as either appurtenant or in gross. (Civ. 14 Code, §§ 801, subd. (4), 802, subd. (5); Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 512, 15 16 521.) In both cases, the easement imposes a burden on the land of another, which is called the 17 servient tenement. (Civ. Code, § 803: County Sanitation Dist. v. Watson Land Co. (1993) 17 18 Cal. App. 4th 1268, 1278.)

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An appurtenant easement creates either a right to use, or a right to restrict the use of, the servient tenement for the use and benefit of real property of the easement owner. (*City of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Cal.* (1978) 82 Cal. App. 3d 763, 767.) An easement in gross is a personal right to use the land of another, and as such it is an *interest* in real property. (*Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp.* (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 520, 527; *Balestra v. Button* (1942) 54 Cal. App. 2d 192, 197.) The property burdened by an easement in

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gross is called the servient tenement, however, because the right does not benefit any particular parcel of property, there is no dominant tenement. (Civ. Code, § 802; *County Sanitation Dist. v. Watson Land Co.* (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 1268, 1279.)

A fundamental principle is that the use of an easement, whether created by express grant, 4 5 implication, or prescription, cannot be altered to impose an unreasonable or unintended burden 6 on the servient tenement. (Thorstrom, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1415.) The owner of the 7 dominant tenement must use his or her easements and rights in such a way as to impose as slight 8 a burden as possible on the servient tenement in accordance with the terms of the grant or as 9 otherwise established when use commenced. (Id. at p. 1422⁴.) Similarly, where an easement or 10 right is obtained by grant, the rights of the grantee must be found in the grant itself. (Woods 11 Irrigation Co. v. Klein (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 266, 269; see also Civ. Code § 806.)) 12

In *Woods, supra*, the Court of Appeal found that even a "general" grant that allowed the grantee to "construct, maintain, police, patrol, operate, extend, widen, and repair as series of canals" for irrigation did not allow the grantee to relocate the canals as need arose. (*Id.* at p. 268-269.) In so finding, the *Woods* Court stated: "Any other rule would make the burden imposed by the easement a matter of perpetual speculation and subject the servient owners to continual uncertainty as to their rights and use and enjoyment of their land." (*Id.* at p. 270.)

In other words, a grant of an easement or right otherwise is limited by the terms of the

instrument creating it. Thus, where a right reserved by a grantor is exercised by the **drilling of**

a well and the installation of a pipeline across the servient tenement, followed by years of use,

that use fixes the limits of the easement, which may not thereafter be increased without the

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⁴ Even where the right is implied from use and not express grant, the grantee's right is fixed and certain in accordance with the type and scope of use as initially commenced, not as later extended or desired by the grantee.
(*Kern Island Irrigating Co. v. City of Bakersfield* (1907) 151 Cal. 403, 406.)

consent of the owner of the servient tenement. (Goubert v. Pomona Val. Water Co. (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d Supp. 852, 853; emphasis added.)

In Goubert v. Pomona Val. Water Co, supra, 137 Cal.App.2d Supp. 852, the Chino Land 3 and Water Company conveyed to the L. M. Jacobs Company several parcels of land, retaining 4 5 the right to develop water on one acre in Lot 46 by artesian or surface wells, and the right to 6 convey such water from said lot. The Chino Land and Water Company conveyed this 'right' to 7 Pellissier, together with the well which had been developed on Lot 46. Appellants acquired Lot 8 46 and respondents acquired the well. Several years later, respondents, over the objection of 9 appellants, entered upon the appellants' land and installed thereon a new structure and a hydro-10 pneumatic system. The Court held that right to develop water by artesian or surface wells and 11 to convey water from land, became fixed, if not by terms of reservation, then by drilling of well 12 and installation of pipeline, and owners of such right, in absence of landowner's consent, could 13 not increase extent of servitude and could not build additional structures for purposes not 14 15 mentioned in grant and not therefore exercised. (Id. at p. 853.) As the Goubert Court expressed, 16 "Where the right, not definitely limited by grant, has become fixed by the manner of its use, it 17 cannot be enlarged without the consent of the parties who may be affected." (Ibid.)

In *Thorstrom, supra*, 196 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1411-1413 the defendant maintained use of water from a well developed in 1969 located on the plaintiff's property. In 1980 an additional well was built on plaintiff's property. No grant deed existed for the 1980 well. (*Id.* at pp. 1412-1415.) Water from the 1980 well was used by the parties' predecessor in interest and serviced both plaintiffs' and defendants' properties. (*Ibid.*) Without plaintiffs' permission the defendants constructed a 2,500-gallon water storage tank on defendants' parcel and diverted all water from the 1980 well to the new storage tank. (*Id.* at p. 1415.) The *Thorstrom* Court held that the

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taking of all water from the 1980 well by defendants constituted an overuse of the implied easement acquired by defendants from prior use of water from the 1980 well; this, the court found, justified issuance of injunctive relief to preclude further excessive and inordinate consumption of the water from the 1980 well, and to prevent a continuation of defendants' unlawful acts which would deprive plaintiffs of their full property rights, including use of the 1980 well. (*Id.* at p. 1425.)

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In *Moore v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co.* (1921) 55 Cal.App. 184, the grantors of two lots, who did not have any title to a third lot (known as lot 8), conveyed by deed with the two lots, "eight fifty-fourths of the water *in the well* on lot 8...to the extent of twenty-six thousand gallons each twenty-four hours." (*Ibid.*, see also p. 188.) The owner of lot 8 thereafter executed a deed conveying to the grantees "the water right described" in the earlier deed, thereby validating the conveyance. (*Id.* at p. 188.)

The grantees later initiated an action for equitable relief. (Id. at pp. 184-185.) They 14 15 alleged that they were the owners of the two lots of land and the owners of the right to eight 16 fifty-fourths of the water on and under lot 8, not just that sourced from the referenced existing 17 well. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeals held that the confirmatory deed did not enlarge the right 18 given to the grantees by the earlier deed, and they acquired only the fractional part of the water 19 in the existing well, and not an equal part of all the waters underlying lot 8. (Id. at p.189.) As 20 the Moore Court expressed, "[t]he plaintiffs may be said then to have shown a clear title by 21 chain of conveyances to a right to eight fifty-fourths of the water in the well which was located 22 on lot 8, such right to be limited to the use of a maximum quantity of 26,000 gallons each 24 23 hours. This is quite a different thing from the possession of a right to that proportion of all the 24 waters underlying lot 8." (Ibid.) The Moore Court further noted: "The water right itself under 25

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the evidence cannot be enlarged from that proportion and quantity fixed in the early conveyance ... in other words, the interest is an interest in the **water in the particular well** and not the water underlying lot 8." (*Id.* at p. 191, emphasis not original.)

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Application to Present Case

Pursuant to stipulation, IBWD admits it is a public agency and that is uses the T5 Well, the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road, and the Improvements for public purposes. The only question is whether IBWD maintained the right to take that property and those property rights without just compensation.

As set forth above, in 1988 Moores granted IBWD the rights to the Unit 9 Well within a 10 particular 30-foot diameter area. (Exhibit 4, page. 2 ¶¶2-3.) The fact of this matter is further 11 confirmed in the parties' 1988 Water Development Agreement (Exhibit 6 [see Book 1764 pages 12 93-96 thereof], which only references-specifically-the Unit 9 well and water from it, not 13 some other well on Moores Property. Exhibit 7, IBWD's plans for the property as approved by 14 15 it on December 5, 1988, was part of the Water Development Agreement and it denotes only the 16 Unit 9 Well and related facilities specifically. It has nothing to do with the T5 Well. Exhibit 12 17 (procured by IBWD) forwards this fact in that it identifies the deeds by which rights to the Unit 18 9 Well, access easements, and facilities were created. (See page 2 thereof and Exhibit 7A [blow 19 up].) Noteworthy is the lack of any reference to any grant in association with the T5 Well. In 20 short, even IBWD's own documents demonstrate no granted rights in relation to the T5 Well. 21

As noted and cited above, Moores did grant an easement to IBWD to (a) use electricity and other utilities, including water distribution lines and telephone lines, to operate and run service to and from the Unit 9 well on the Moores property and (b) water distribution lines to operate and run service to and from the water storage tank on the 60' by 60' tank site easement

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and Unit 9 well on the Moores Property, and it further granted IBWD the facilities used to operate the Unit 9 Well. (See also, Exhibits 9-10.) Nothing in those grants extends beyond the Unit 9 Well in particular.⁵

In August 2008, IBWD drilled and constructed a new well also known as the "Tank 5 4 5 well." As noted, the Tank 5 Well is approximately 150-200 yards from the Unit 9 Well, and 6 thus outside the referenced 30' diameter Unit 9 well easement granted. In other words, the T5 7 Well is not located within the 30-foot diameter space referenced in the easement made part of 8 Document 11632 (at Book 1697 page 413), which document is, its entirety, Exhibit 4 of the 9 Stipulated Deeds and Documents. IBWD admits is uses the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road 10 to access the Tank 5 Well on Moores' Property. IBWD admits it has pumped water from the 11 Tank 5 Well since its construction for use, including sale, within the service boundaries of 12 IBWD as part of its operations as a public agency in providing water to such properties for 13 public purposes. IBWD admits it uses or could use the Improvements for the T5 Well. 14

IBWD had no permission, authority, or consent otherwise to drill, construct, take, or use
the Tank 5 Well the property on and in which it lies, to pump, use, or otherwise take water from
the Tank 5 Well, or to use the Alta Mesa Road and Improvements to access, service, or
otherwise operate the Tank 5 Well. Nothing, including the Stipulated Deeds and Documents,
gave or gives IBWD any right to the same, and certainly not without payment to Moores of just
compensation.

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2008 when IBWD entered onto Moores' property and drilled and constructed the Tank 5 Well.

PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

The actions of IBWD represent an inverse condemnation commenced as of August

 ⁵ Other grants by Moores contained in the Stipulated Deeds on Documents are outside Moores Property, as described in particular (legally) above. Hence, the grants do not and cannot pertain to the T5 Well located on Moores Property.

The rights granted to IBWD in 1988-1990 are limited by the terms of the instruments creating them. The easement granted in 1988 did not allow for the drilling, construction and use of the 2 Tank 5 well. Moreover, the original construction of the Unit 9 well and storage tank, and the 3 installation of a pipeline across the Moores property, followed by years of use (1989-2008), 4 fixed the limits of the easement, which may not thereafter be increased without the consent of 5 6 the owner of Moores.

7 The continued taking of water from the Tank 5 well deprives Moores of their full 8 property rights. As expressed by the *Moore*, supra, the granting of water rights to a well and 9 storage tank on the Moores property is quite different thing from granting possession of a right 10 to of all the waters underlying the Moores property. Therefore, IBWD's actions represent a 11 condemnation of the Tank 5 well and the water contained therein. As a result, everything that 12 enters into its value is to be considered, and compensation must be awarded for any water rights 13 in connection therewith. 14

IV. CONCLUSION

16 The deeds submitted into evidence in this action are definitive and dispositive for purposes of establishing IBWD's liability for inverse condemnation. Recognition of fundamental property rights along with proper construction of the deeds plainly establishes IBWD's liability. Only by ignoring both the deeds' plain language and well-established legal 20 principals concerning the scope of IBWD's lawful rights may a finding otherwise result.

In short, IBWD maintains no right—without payment of just compensation—to drill, 22 construct, or take water from Plaintiffs' property via the T5 Well. Similarly, absent just 23 compensation, IBWD maintains no right to use any roadway, pipelines, or utilities to operate the 24 25 T5 Well. Consequently, IBWD inversely condemned: the T5 Well; water that has been or may

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1 2 3 4 5 6	 be taken from the T5 Well; use of the subject roadway, pipelines, and utilities in its operation of the T5 Well. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request the court grant it Judgment establishing IBWD's liability for inverse condemnation of: the T5 Well; water taken, and that which may be taken, from the T5 Well; use of the Private Portion of Alta Mesa Road for IBWD's operation of, and service to, the T5 well; and use of other Improvements in IBWD's operation of, and service
7	to, the T5 Well.
8	Dated: January 10, 2012 Respectfully submitted,
10	LAW OFFICE OF DUNCAN M. JAMES
11	Frank memol
12	DONALD J. McMULLEN Attorney for Plaintiffs
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	- 15 - PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION LIABILITY

1	PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
2	I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County of Mendocino. I am over
3	the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within above entitled action; my business address
4	is 445 N. State Street, Ukiah, CA 95482. On January 10, 2012, I served the within
5	PLAINTIFFS' OPENING BRIEF RE: PHASE ONE TRIAL - INVERSE CONDEMNATION
6	LIABILITY by electronic mail and by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope
7	with postage thereof fully prepaid, in the United States post office box at Ukiah, California,
8	addressed as follows:
10	Matthew L. Emrick, Esq. E-mail: <u>matthew@mlelaw.com</u>
11	Law Office of Matthew Emrick 6520 Lone Tree Blvd., #1009
12	Rocklin, CA 95765
13	I, Katie Brown, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
14	Executed this 10 th day of January, 2012, at Ukiah, California.
15	(the A
16	KATTE BROWN
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